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OPINION 
______________ 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge.  
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department of 
Human Services (“Pennsylvania”) appeals from a decision and 
order of the District Court for the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania entered March 13, 2017, affirming a decision of 
the United States Department of Health and Human Services 
Departmental Appeals Board (“Appeals Board” or “Board”).  
For the following reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s 
order and thus will affirm the Board’s decision. 
 
 
II. BACKGROUND 
 This case involves a reimbursement dispute between 
Pennsylvania and the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services 
(“CMS”) over the cost of a provider training program.  From 
1996 to 2011 Pennsylvania claimed the costs of the training 
program as administrative costs under its Medicaid program.  
CMS reimbursed Pennsylvania for about $3 million of those 
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costs, but, after an audit of Pennsylvania’s charges, it sought a 
return of the money on the ground that funds Pennsylvania spent 
on training programs were not reimbursable to the 
Commonwealth from the federal government as administrative 
costs under Medicaid.  In reaching its decision, CMS relied 
heavily on a 1994 State Medicaid Director Letter (“1994 
SMDL” or “the Letter”), which explained that training program 
costs are excluded from the definition of reimbursable 
administrative costs under the Medicaid statute.  The Appeals 
Board sustained CMS’s decision.  Our review of the agency’s 
final decision is narrow.  We limit our determination to deciding 
whether the Appeals Board’s decision complies with the 
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq.1 
  
 A.  Medicaid Statutory and Regulatory Framework 
 
  To begin, we set forth some background of the Medicaid 
program and its reimbursement provisions for state 
administrative costs.  With the passage of Title XIX of the 
Social Security Act, Congress authorized the creation of the 
Medicaid program, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396 et seq., “a cooperative 
federal-state program that provides medical care to needy 
individuals.”  Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 565 
U.S. 606, 610, 132 S.Ct. 1204, 1208 (2012).  States such as 
Pennsylvania that opt into the program must submit a plan that 
complies with the Medicaid statute and the Secretary of Health 
and Human Services’ (“HHS”) implementing regulations.  42 
                                                 
1 Of course, the appeal to us is from the order of the District 
Court but we state the question as if the appeal is from the 
Appeals Board’s decision because our review of the District 
Court summary judgment is de novo. 
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U.S.C. §§ 1396, 1396a; 42 C.F.R. § 430.15(a).  Within HHS, 
CMS oversees state compliance with Medicaid requirements.  
42 C.F.R. § 430.15(b). 
 
 Under this cooperative program, the federal government 
reimburses a state for a portion of its expenditures for both 
“medical assistance” (i.e., medical care and services) and 
“administration” of the Medicaid program.  42 U.S.C. §§ 
1396b(a), 1396d(a).  There is a statute establishing the amount 
of federal funding available to a state for such expenditures, 
known as Federal Financial Participation (“FFP”).  See 42 
U.S.C. § 1396b(a).    
 
 Section 1396b(a)(7) governs the administrative costs at 
issue in this case.  Id. § 1396b(a)(7).2  Specifically, § 
1396b(a)(7) sets the usual amount of FFP at 50 percent for costs 
that are “found necessary by the Secretary for the proper and 
efficient administration of the State plan.”  That is, states can 
receive 50 cents on the dollar for costs claimed under their plans 
that meet the definition of administrative costs in § 1396b(a)(7). 
 To implement this provision, HHS promulgated 42 C.F.R § 
433.15(b)(7), which included the statutory FFP percentage for 
reimbursement and a summary explanation of administrative 
costs.  See 42 C.F.R. § 433.15(b)(7) (“All other activities the 
Secretary finds necessary for proper and efficient administration 
of the State plan: 50 percent.”).  But neither the statute nor the 
implementing regulation defines “administration” or 
“necessary.” 
                                                 
2 This case only involves claims for administrative costs under § 
1396b(a)(7).  Pennsylvania does not claim that the training costs 
were allowable under other provisions of the Medicaid statute. 
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 B.  The 1994 SMDL 
 
 In 1994 the Health Care Financing Administration 
(“HCFA”), CMS’s predecessor, published the 1994 SMDL.  
After an influx of inappropriately claimed administrative 
activities, HCFA issued the Letter to “reiterate [its] long-
standing policy on allowable administrative costs.”  JA 109.  
The 1994 SMDL quotes § 1396b(a)(7)’s requirement that FFP is 
permitted only for amounts “found necessary by the Secretary 
for the proper and efficient administration of the State Plan.”  JA 
109.  It then interprets that language to mean that “allowable 
claims . . . must be directly related to the administration of the 
Medicaid program.”  JA 109.  
 
 The 1994 SMDL gives examples of administrative costs 
that HCFA has allowed in the past.  Among other items those 
costs include Medicaid eligibility determinations, Medicaid 
outreach, prior authorization for Medicaid services, and 
Medicaid Management Information System development and 
operation. 
 
 The Letter also lists examples of expenses that are not 
regarded as administrative costs.  Importantly for our purposes, 
it states that allowable costs do not include “the overhead costs 
of operating a provider facility, such as the supervision and 
training of providers.”  JA 113.  Besides such training costs, the 
Letter also excludes costs for medical services.  It recites that 
administrative costs cannot be “the cost of providing a direct 
medical or remedial service,” or “an integral part or extension of 
a direct medical or remedial service. . . .”  Id.  It states that 
“[s]uch services are properly paid for as part of the payment for 
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the medical or remedial service.  Because Medicaid providers 
have agreed to accept service payment as payment in full, such 
providers may not claim an additional cost as [an] administrative 
cost under the State plan.”  Id. 
 
 With this background in mind, we turn to this case. 
 
 C.  Pennsylvania’s Restraint Reduction Initiative 
 
 In 1987 Congress amended Title XIX of the Social 
Security Act to include nursing home reforms.  The amended 
Act provided that nursing home facilities could no longer use 
physical and chemical restraints on their residents for discipline 
or convenience reasons.  42 U.S.C. § 1396r(c)(1)(A)(ii).  The 
regulations required nursing facilities to train their staff on these 
new care standards.  42 C.F.R. §§ 483.12(b)(3), 483.95(c).   
   
 In response to these reforms, Pennsylvania created the 
Pennsylvania Restraint Reduction Initiative (“PARRI”).  The 
stated objective of the program which began in 1996 was “to 
train long term care facility staff in the use of alternative 
measures to physical and chemical restraints.”  JA 275, 298.  
Pennsylvania contracted with Kendal Outreach LLC (“Kendal”) 
to supply the provider training.  Kendal began by training 
nursing home staff at four training sites but expanded the 
number of sites to twenty six across the state over the next few 
years.     
 
 At all relevant times Pennsylvania paid for the Kendal 
contract through various funding methods and made claims to 
CMS to reimburse it for the cost of the contract.  Pennsylvania 
consistently claimed the contract costs as Medicaid program 
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administrative expenses.  But it did so without expressly 
advising CMS of what it was doing for when it completed the 
CMS form to report administrative costs, it did not specifically 
itemize the PARRI payments.  Instead, it lumped those 
payments into a larger amount that it claimed as “Other 
Financial Participation.”  JA 249.  From 1996 to 2011, CMS 
reimbursed Pennsylvania a total of $3,001,536 for the PARRI 
program.     
  
 Pennsylvania’s claims for administrative costs eventually 
came to the attention of the HHS Office of Inspector General 
(“OIG”).  From 2011 to 2012 the OIG conducted an audit of 
Pennsylvania’s claims for Medicaid administrative costs for 
provider training under PARRI.  According to OIG, the audit 
was initiated because Pennsylvania relied on the CMS form’s 
“Other Financial Participation” section to claim large sums of 
FFP.  For example, from 2010 to 2011, the OIG audit notes that 
Pennsylvania claimed $924 million in administrative costs, of 
which $654 million were unidentified costs lumped together as 
“Other Financial Participation.”  JA 265.  OIG also noted that it 
previously identified two other Pennsylvania programs that 
failed to comply with the administrative cost requirements under 
the Medicaid program.  In the audit, OIG concluded that the 
PARRI costs were not administrative costs, but rather “were for 
training nursing home provider staff to improve the condition of 
nursing home residents.”  JA 266.  The audit report stated that 
“CMS explicitly prohibits claiming costs for provider training, 
such as that supplied by Kendal for the Initiative, as 
administrative costs, because they are not for the proper and 
efficient administration of the [Medicaid] State plan.”  Id. 
(quotation marks omitted).  The OIG audit thus recommended 
that CMS require Pennsylvania to refund the $3,001,536 and 
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discontinue all future claims for PARRI costs.   
   
 In June 2014 CMS sent a letter to Pennsylvania notifying 
it of its decision to disallow the $3,001,536 in FFP.  CMS 
explained the administrative cost requirements under § 
1396b(a)(7) and the 1994 SMDL and adopted the OIG’s 
findings.  CMS concluded that “the costs of the Initiative do not 
constitute general administrative costs of the Medicaid program. 
 Rather, these costs constitute nursing facility overhead costs 
[because] the training was intended to support and augment the 
in-service training for nursing facilities and to enhance the 
quality of service delivery at nursing facilities.”  JA 76. 
 
 D.  Procedural Background 
 
 Pennsylvania appealed CMS’s disallowance decision to 
the HHS Appeals Board, which affirmed the decision in a 
written opinion.  At the outset, the Appeals Board noted that 
Pennsylvania made two key factual concessions material to this 
dispute which thus are material to this appeal:  Pennsylvania did 
not dispute receiving the 1994 SMDL before it created PARRI, 
and did “not deny that the disallowed claims were for the costs 
of training nursing facility staff. . . .”  JA 26. 
   
 The Appeals Board then found that the PARRI costs 
were disallowable.  The Board determined that the 1994 SMDL 
expressly prohibits states from claiming provider training as a 
cost of administering the plan.  The Board also stated that “the 
prohibition in the 1994 SMDL on states claiming provider 
training and other medical assistance costs as costs of 
administering their Medicaid state plans was not a new policy.”  
JA 27.  In support of this observation, the Board cited two of its 
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pre-1994-SMDL decisions, New York State Department of 
Social Services, DAB No. 1146 (1990), and New York State 
Department of Social Services, DAB No. 1252 (1991), in which 
the Board held that provider training costs were not 
administrative costs under § 1396b. 
 
 The Appeals Board further stated that although states 
cannot claim training costs as administrative costs, CMS may be 
able to reimburse states for training costs in other ways.  
Specifically, the Board noted that states can recover provider 
training costs through provider reimbursements rates for medical 
assistance.  The Board explained that there is a twofold rationale 
for this authorization.  First, when the state claims training costs 
through the rate system, it must ensure that such costs are 
reasonable and adequate under the relevant regulations.  Second, 
the prohibition on classifying direct services as administrative 
costs “is necessary to prevent duplicate program payment for the 
same activities.”  JA 30 (internal citations omitted).  Thus, the 
Board stated that Pennsylvania may have been able to use the 
rate system for reimbursement of the training costs, but it had 
not done so; and it could not circumvent that treatment by 
separately claiming training costs as administrative expenses. 
   
 Finally, the Appeals Board rejected Pennsylvania’s 
arguments that (1) the 1994 SMDL is an invalid substantive 
rule, (2) PARRI training cannot be disallowed on the basis of 
the 1994 SMDL because the training costs were not overhead 
costs, (3) Pennsylvania is entitled to discovery from CMS on 
whether it previously agreed to reimburse the PARRI costs as 
administrative costs, and (4) the HHS Grants Administration 
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Manual (“GAM”) limits the disallowance period to three years.3 
  
 In 2015 Pennsylvania challenged the Appeals Board’s 
decision in the District Court, asserting that the disallowance 
violated the APA.  On the defendants’ motion the Court granted 
summary judgment against Pennsylvania, holding that the 
administrative record supported the agency action and was 
consistent with the APA standard of review.  Pennsylvania 
Dep’t of Human Servs. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs., 241 F. Supp. 3d 506, 517 (M.D. Pa. 2017).  Specifically, 
the Court found that (1) the 1994 SMDL was not a substantive 
rule subject to APA public notice and comment but rather was 
an interpretive rule not so subject; (2) Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 
323 U.S. 134, 65 S.Ct. 161 (1944) required the Court to give the 
Letter judicial deference; and (3) there was no basis under the 
APA to overturn the Board’s conclusions that (a) the 1994 
SMDL barred reimbursement of PARRI costs, (b) the 
disallowance period was not limited to three years, and (c) 
Pennsylvania was not entitled to additional discovery.  
Pennsylvania Dep’t of Human Servs., 241 F. Supp. 3d at 514-
17.  The Court also denied Pennsylvania’s request to take 
judicial notice of a 2015 CMS Question and Answer document 
published online after the Board issued its decision.  Id. at 511-
12. 
 
 Pennsylvania timely appealed from the District Court’s 
final order.  See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B).  
                                                 
3 Pennsylvania also argued unsuccessfully that other CMS 
issuances and regulations permit FFP for provider training costs 
contrary to the 1994 SMDL, but with limited exception 
Pennsylvania does not raise those arguments before us now. 
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III.  STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND STANDARD 
OF REVIEW 
 
 The District Court had jurisdiction to review the decision 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1316(e)(2)(C), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706, and 28 
U.S.C. 1331.  We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1291.   
 
 “We apply de novo review to a district court’s grant of 
summary judgment in a case brought under the APA, and in turn 
apply the applicable standard of review to the underlying agency 
decision.”  Pennsylvania, Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. Sebelius, 674 
F.3d 139, 146 (3d Cir. 2012) (internal quotations omitted).  
Under the APA, courts must set aside agency action that is 
“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in 
accordance with law,” or is conducted “without observance of 
procedure required by law. . . .” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) & (D). 
 
 Under “this narrow standard of review, we insist that an 
agency examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory 
explanation for its action.”  F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations, 
Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 513, 129 S.Ct. 1800, 1810 (2009) (internal 
citation and quotation marks omitted).  Agency action will be 
arbitrary and capricious “if the agency has relied on factors 
which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to 
consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an 
explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence 
before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be 
ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency 
expertise.”  Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State 
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Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43, 103 S.Ct. 2856, 2867 
(1983).4 
 
IV.  DISCUSSION 
 
 Pennsylvania makes six challenges to the disallowance 
decision and thus to the summary judgment.  It argues that (1) 
the 1994 SMDL is an invalid substantive rule, (2) the 1994 
SMDL’s text does not exclude PARRI training costs from 
reimbursement, (3) the 1994 SMDL imposes an ambiguous 
condition on a federal grant, (4) the Appeals Board abused its 
discretion in denying discovery, (5) the HHS Grants 
Administration Manual limits the disallowance period to three 
years, and (6) the District Court should have taken judicial 
notice of the 2015 CMS Question and Answer document.  We 
will address each argument in turn and explain why we find 
none persuasive. 
 
 A. The 1994 SMDL Is an Interpretive Rule, Not a         
           Legislative Rule 
 Pennsylvania’s first argument can be regarded as 
procedural.  Pennsylvania challenges the use of the 1994 SMDL, 
                                                 
4 Pennsylvania incorrectly asserts that our review of many of its 
arguments is plenary, citing Beta Spawn, Inc. v. FFE 
Transportation Services, Inc., 250 F.3d 218, 223 (3d Cir. 2001), 
but that case did not involve an agency action or the APA.  As 
such, even though our review of the summary judgment is de 
novo, the standard APA judicial review standards which are 
more deferential govern this case. 
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arguing that the agency’s reliance on the Letter violated the 
APA because the Letter was not adopted after compliance with 
the notice and comment procedures for the adoption of a rule 
under the APA.  See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b), (c).  Appellees respond 
that the 1994 SMDL is an interpretive rule, not subject to a 
requirement for public notice and comment.  See id. § 
553(b)(A).  Though we have determined that other HCFA state 
Medicaid director letters were interpretive rules, see Elizabeth 
Blackwell Health Ctr. for Women v. Knoll, 61 F.3d 170, 181 
(3d Cir. 1995), we never have determined whether the 1994 
SMDL is an interpretive rule.  Now, however, in this matter of 
first impression on this point, we conclude that the 1994 SMDL 
is interpretive and is not a substantive or legislative rule.   
 
 The APA requirement that an agency rule go through 
notice and comment procedures applies only to so-called 
“legislative” or “substantive” rules, not to “interpretive” rules.  5 
U.S.C. § 553(b), (c).  Though it is not always easy to distinguish 
between the two types of rules, we have developed guiding 
principles to aid in distinguishing them.  Legislative rules, which 
have the force of law, “impose new duties upon the regulated 
party.”  Chao v. Rothermel, 327 F.3d 223, 227 (3d Cir. 2003).  
‘“Interpretive’ rules, on the other hand, seek only to interpret 
language already in properly issued regulations.”  Id. (citation 
omitted); Elizabeth Blackwell, 61 F.3d at 181 (deeming HCFA’s 
letter to state Medicaid directors that interpreted Medicaid 
statute to be interpretive guidance because it “clarifies and 
explains existing law”).  Interpretive rules do not add language 
to or amend language in the statute, Chao, 327 F.3d at 227, but 
“simply state[] what the administrative agency thinks the statute 
means, and only remind[] affected parties of existing duties,” 
SBC Inc. v. F.C.C., 414 F.3d 486, 498 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting 
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Fertilizer Inst. v. U.S. E.P.A., 935 F.2d 1303, 1307 (D.C. Cir. 
1991)).   
 
 Based on these principles, the 1994 SMDL is an 
interpretive rule.  As stated above, the Letter explains § 
1396b(a)(7)’s statutory requirement that costs must be 
“necessary . . . for the proper and efficient administration of the 
State plan.”  JA 109, 112 (emphasis removed).  It “reiterates” 
that CMS interprets the statutory requirement to mean the costs 
“must be directly related to the administration of the Medicaid 
program.”  JA 109, 112.  It then explains how that policy works 
“in several particular situations,” JA 112, providing a non-
exhaustive list of costs that do and do not meet CMS’s 
interpretation of the statute including the exclusion of training 
costs. 
 
The 1994 SMDL thus qualifies as an interpretive rule on 
several levels.  The Letter represents what the Secretary “thinks 
[§ 1396b(a)(7)] means,” see SBC Inc., 414 F.3d at 498, i.e., that 
costs are “necessary” for plan administration when they are 
“directly related” to plan administration.  The Letter also 
“clarifies and explains” the statute, Elizabeth Blackwell, 61 F.3d 
at 181, by describing types of costs that are not “directly 
related,” such as the cost of providing direct medical services, 
see JA 112-13.  These features indicate the 1994 SMDL is an 
interpretive rule.   
 
The Letter’s discussion of training costs, the particular 
portion of the Letter that Pennsylvania challenges, reinforces 
this conclusion.  This discussion about training costs provides an 
example of how the agency applies its rule in practice, a 
treatment which we have held is indicative of an interpretive 
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rule.  See Bailey v. Sullivan, 885 F.2d 52, 62 (3d Cir. 1989) 
(holding social security administration publication that “contains 
merely examples of the application of the [at-issue] regulations” 
was interpretive rule); see also L.A. Closeout, Inc. v. Dep’t of 
Homeland Sec., 513 F.3d 940, 942 (9th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) 
(holding agency memo “simply provided the agency’s 
construction of the regulation in a particular factual 
circumstance.  As such, notice and comment procedures were 
not required”).  Finally, inasmuch as the purpose of the Letter is 
to reiterate the agency position, the Letter expressly “reminds 
affected parties” of these interpretations in light of states’ past 
misapplication of the rule.  See SBC Inc., 414 F.3d at 498.  
Accordingly, the 1994 SMDL is an interpretive rule not subject 
to the APA’s notice and comment procedures.5 
                                                 
5The Appeals Board did not address the question of whether the 
1994 SMDL is an interpretive or substantive rule.  Instead, it 
held that “the 1994 SMDL was binding on Pennsylvania in any 
event.”  JA 32.  The Board explained that the 1994 SMDL is 
entitled to deference because it is a reasonable interpretation of 
the ambiguous definition of administrative costs in § 
1396b(a)(7) and Pennsylvania was on notice of that 
interpretation.  JA 32.  We question the Board’s reasoning.  If 
the 1994 SMDL Letter were an improperly promulgated 
legislative rule, the Letter would be invalid—thus the agency 
could not have based the disallowance on it.  See State of 
Alaska v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 868 F.2d 441, 445 (D.C. Cir. 
1989) (deeming legislative rule “invalid by virtue of the 
[agency’s] failure to employ notice-and-comment procedures”); 
see also Elizabeth Blackwell, 61 F.3d at 188 (Nygaard, J., 
dissenting) (Legislative rules promulgated without notice and 
comment “are not true legislative rules at all, but rather 
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 We realize that Pennsylvania contends that our reading of 
the Letter contradicts our prior case law.  Pennsylvania argues 
that Federal Labor Relations Authority v. United States 
Department of the Navy, 966 F.2d 747 (3d Cir. 1992) (en banc) 
(hereafter “FLRA”) is “closely on point” and supports its claim 
that the Letter is a legislative rule.  Pennsylvania Br. 17.  But 
FLRA does not offer support for its contention.  Pennsylvania 
                                                                                                             
examples of invalid spurious rules. . . .”).  Nonetheless, because 
we conclude that the 1994 SMDL is an interpretive rule, and 
because we agree with the Board’s conclusion that the 1994 
SMDL reiterated longstanding agency policy, we may affirm its 
decision. 
 
 We note that, while we question the agency’s reasoning, 
our decision to affirm comports with the Supreme Court’s 
Chenery doctrine.  Under the Chenery doctrine, “a reviewing 
court, in dealing with a determination or judgment which an 
administrative agency alone is authorized to make, must judge 
the propriety of such action solely by the grounds invoked by the 
agency.”  S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196, 67 S.Ct. 
1575, 1577 (1947).  But the issue here falls under a recognized 
exception to the doctrine.  “Chenery reversal is not necessary 
where, as here, the agency has come to a conclusion to which it 
was bound to come as a matter of law, albeit for the wrong 
reason, and where, as here, the agency’s incorrect reasoning was 
confined to that discrete question of law and played no part in its 
discretionary determination.”  United Video, Inc. v. F.C.C., 890 
F.2d 1173, 1190 (D.C. Cir. 1989).  We therefore may uphold the 
agency’s correct conclusion without endorsing its reasoning. 
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misreads that case, suggesting that in FLRA we invalidated an 
Office of Personnel Management (“OPM”) interpretation of the 
word “necessary” because it was a legislative rule that was 
designed to have a measurable impact.  Pennsylvania then likens 
the circumstances in FLRA to those here, because the agencies 
in both situations interpreted the word “necessary.”  Our holding 
in FLRA was quite different, however, because in that case we 
assumed, without deciding, that OPM’s interpretation was an 
interpretive rule because the parties and “[o]ther courts of 
appeals to consider the issue [had] also cast the rule as 
interpretive.”   Id. at 762.  We then rejected the agency’s 
interpretation for a reason unrelated to this case:  because the 
OPM failed to publish it in a meaningful way.  Id. at 764.  
FLRA accordingly does not support Pennsylvania’s erroneous 
argument that the 1994 SMDL is an invalid substantive rule. 
 
In reaching our result, we have taken into account the 
recent decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
First Circuit in New Hampshire Hospital Ass’n v. Azar, 887 
F.3d 62 (1st Cir. 2018), that was decided after the argument in 
this case and on which Pennsylvania relies.  There, the court 
held that a CMS answer in a Frequently-Asked-Questions 
(“FAQ”) document was an invalid legislative rule.  The FAQ 
stated, in essence, that hospitals which serve Medicaid patients 
must reduce their reimbursement claims for those services by 
any amount they already received from Medicare and private 
insurance.  Two main features led the court to find the FAQ a 
legislative rule:  the absence of a statutory standard for the 
Secretary’s action and the FAQ’s bare language.  Neither feature 
appears in our case.   
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            First, the statutes underlying the 1994 SMDL and the 
FAQ are different.  New Hampshire Hospital does not concern § 
1396b(a)(7) or administrative costs.  Rather it involves 42 
U.S.C. § 1396r-4(g)(1), which deals with caps on 
reimbursements to hospitals for medical services to Medicaid 
patients.  Specifically, that statute provides that reimbursements 
to hospitals for Medicaid services cannot exceed the hospital’s 
“costs incurred” in furnishing those services.  But the statute 
leaves it to the Secretary to decide what payments must be offset 
from “costs incurred.”  42 U.S.C. § 1396r-4(g)(1)(A) (“A 
payment adjustment during a fiscal year shall not . . . exceed[ ] 
the costs incurred during the year of furnishing hospital services 
[]as determined by the Secretary. . . .”).  The court found it 
significant that the statute lacked any standard for what “costs 
incurred” means and left it to the Secretary to fill that gap.  It 
stated that this “textual silence” suggests that any agency rule 
implementing the statute is likely substantive, reasoning that, 
“[w]here Congress has specifically declined to create a standard, 
the [agency] cannot claim its implementing rule is an 
interpretation of the statute.”  New Hampshire Hosp., 887 F.3d 
at 71 (alteration in original) (quoting Mendoza v. Perez, 754 
F.3d 1002, 1022 (D.C. Cir. 2014)).  
 
            Unlike § 1396r-4(g)(1), which does not provide a 
standard to guide the Secretary in implementing the “costs 
incurred” rule, § 1396b(a)(7) does provide a meaningful 
standard for the administrative expenses rule.  It instructs the 
Secretary that administrative expenses are amounts “found 
necessary by the Secretary for the proper and efficient 
administration of the State plan.”  So, Congress has not granted 
the Secretary carte blanche authority to fill in a statutory gap as 
it did in the statute involved in New Hampshire Hospital; rather, 
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it gave the Secretary a rule (administrative costs under § 
1396b(a)(7) are reimbursed at 50%) and provided a standard 
(administrative costs are costs “necessary . . . for the proper and 
efficient administration of the State plan”) to help the Secretary 
apply that rule in practice.  Thus, because § 1396b(a)(7) contains 
a meaningful standard, the Secretary here can claim that the 
1994 SMDL is an interpretation of the statute.  
  
            The second feature of New Hampshire Hospital, the bare 
language, is also absent from our case.  There, the court 
expressed concern with the language used in the 
FAQ.  Specifically, the FAQ stated that “costs incurred” must 
exclude payments hospitals receive from Medicare and private 
insurance.  In reaching this conclusion, however, the FAQ 
provided no interpretation of the statute or regulation, and did 
not explain how the new set-offs flowed from those 
authorities.  The Secretary merely noted the statute’s textual 
silence and asserted the new rule.  The court noted that “such an 
announcement, without reasoned interpretive explanation, looks 
to us more as if the Secretary is using delegated power to 
announce a new policy out of whole cloth, rather than engaging 
in an interpretive exercise.”  887 F.3d at 72.  Here, however, the 
1994 SMDL does link its rule to the statutory and regulatory 
language.  It charts the statutory and regulatory standards, 
discusses how states have misinterpreted § 1396b(a)(7) in the 
past, and explains why various expenditures like training costs 
are more like medical services and overhead than administrative 
work and thus cannot be “necessary . . . for the proper and 
efficient administration of the State plan.”  As such, the 
Secretary did engage in an interpretive exercise when crafting 
the 1994 SMDL. 
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 As a side note, we see some irony in Pennsylvania’s 
reliance on New Hampshire Hospital.  If anything, the decision 
cautions us to look out for substantive rules masquerading as 
agency interpretations in online question-and-answer 
documents.  Yet, as we will see later, Pennsylvania contends 
that we give a similar CMS document from 2015 controlling 
weight over the 1994 SMDL.  While we take no position on the 
validity of the 2015 CMS document, we note that New 
Hampshire Hospital offers no aid to Pennsylvania on that point 
either. 
 
 In sum, New Hampshire Hospital does not change our 
conclusion that the 1994 SMDL is a valid interpretive rule. 
 
 B. The 1994 SMDL’s Application to PARRI Training  
           Costs 
 
 Second, Pennsylvania challenges the agency’s application 
of the 1994 SMDL to exclude reimbursement for PARRI 
training costs as overhead expenses.6  The 1994 SMDL 
                                                 
6 Pennsylvania does not make a substantial challenge to the 
District Court’s grant of Skidmore deference to the 1994 SMDL. 
 The Court granted Skidmore deference to the Letter because the 
terms “necessary” and “administration” were undefined in the 
statute and were ambiguous; Congress delegated the 
interpretation of those words to the Secretary; and although 
interpretive guidelines like the 1994 SMDL do not carry the 
force of law, the 1994 SMDL was persuasive because it 
“reflect[ed] a reasonable and considered interpretation” of the 
statute.  Pennsylvania Dep’t of Human Servs., 241 F. Supp. 3d 
at 513-14.  In response, Pennsylvania argues only that the Court 
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excluded from administrative costs all “overhead costs of 
operating a provider facility such as the supervision and training 
of providers.”  JA 113.   
 
 Pennsylvania claims that PARRI training costs cannot be 
overhead costs.  Specifically, Pennsylvania argues that overhead 
costs are defined as “necessary costs incurred by a company in 
its operations which cannot be easily identified with any 
individual product,” relying on a definition of “overhead” from 
an out-of-circuit case about a union dispute published over sixty 
years ago.  Pennsylvania Br. 18 (quoting United Elec., Radio. & 
Mach. Workers of Am. v. Oliver Corp., 205 F.2d 376, 387 (8th 
Cir. 1953)).  Based on that definition, Pennsylvania claims that 
the PARRI training costs cannot be regarded as overhead 
expenditures because PARRI training is not a cost nursing home 
providers “must incur to operate their facilities,” and nursing 
home providers did not pay for the training.  Pennsylvania Br. 
18-19. 
   
 As a threshold matter on this overhead issue, we note that 
we question whether we need to decide whether the Letter’s 
discussion of overhead captures PARRI costs because the 
Appeals Board provided separate support for its disallowance.  
The Board stated that provider training is disallowable under 
other portions of the 1994 SMDL, even without the overhead 
                                                                                                             
should not have granted any deference because the 1994 SMDL 
does permit reimbursement of training costs as administrative 
costs.  Pennsylvania Br. 18.  As we will explain in this section, 
that argument is meritless, the 1994 SMDL does apply to 
PARRI costs, and there is no reason to disturb the Court’s 
application of Skidmore deference to the Letter. 
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costs language.  Given the language of § 1396b, 42 C.F.R. § 
433.15, and the prior Board decisions, the Board found that 
“exclusion of provider training from Medicaid administration 
reflects the longstanding principle . . . that a state may not claim 
costs of medical assistance rendered by providers as the state 
agency’s Medicaid administrative cost.”  JA 31.  Thus, the 
finding that provider training is related to medical assistance and 
therefore cannot be an administrative cost is a sufficient basis 
for us to uphold the decision.   
 
Nonetheless we will reach Pennsylvania’s argument.  We 
conclude that the Appeals Board considered Pennsylvania’s 
arguments and rendered a plausible decision rejecting them.  See 
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., 463 U.S. at 43, 103 S.Ct. at 
2867.  The Board gave no weight to Pennsylvania’s narrow 
definition of overhead.  We, too, see no reason to read 
“overhead” to mean costs a company “must” incur.  Indeed, as 
the term is generally understood, “overhead” can include all 
kinds of costs, both necessary and permissive.  See 
OVERHEAD, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (making 
no mention of costs that must be incurred).  Further, were we to 
agree that Pennsylvania’s definition was more on point than the 
Secretary’s, we still would side with the Secretary because the 
Secretary bears responsibility for making the overhead 
determination.  See Elizabeth Blackwell, 61 F.3d at 181 
(“[p]erhaps appreciating the complexity of what it had wrought, 
Congress conferred on the Secretary exceptionally broad 
authority to prescribe standards for applying certain sections of 
the [Medicaid] Act.”) (quoting Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 
U.S. 34, 43, 101 S.Ct. 2633, 2640 (1981)) (alterations in 
original).  Thus, because the Board gave a plausible reason to 
reject Pennsylvania’s narrow definition of overhead, and 
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because the Secretary has broad authority to define overhead, we 
reject Pennsylvania’s argument that the 1994 SMDL excludes 
only provider training that a company must incur. 
 
 We also reject Pennsylvania’s argument that PARRI 
training costs are allowable because nursing home providers did 
not pay for them.  The argument goes as follows:  providers pay 
for overhead costs, but the state, not the provider, paid for the 
training, so the cost of the training cannot be an overhead cost.  
But that argument misses the point.  Had Pennsylvania 
structured the PARRI payments correctly, the providers would 
have paid for the training.  And CMS could have reimbursed 
Pennsylvania for those costs if Pennsylvania factored the 
amount into its rate-setting scheme instead of claiming the 
amount as administrative costs. 
 
 The 1994 SMDL and the Appeals Board explained why 
this is the case.  The Letter explains that “[s]uch services are 
properly paid for as part of the payment made for the medical or 
remedial service.”  JA 113.  It states that “[b]ecause Medicaid 
providers have agreed to accept service payment as payment in 
full, such providers may not claim an additional cost as [an] 
administrative cost under the State plan.”  Id.  The Board further 
explained, as noted above, that this payment scheme forces 
states to ensure that the costs are reasonable and adequate, and 
prevents duplicative payments to states and providers for the 
same activity.  So, even accepting Pennsylvania’s claim that 
overhead must be paid by the provider, its argument still fails 
because the provider should have paid the costs for the PARRI 
training.   
 
 But Pennsylvania contends that CMS encouraged 
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Pennsylvania to create the PARRI program, so it argues that 
CMS cannot now say that Pennsylvania should not have paid for 
the program.  We disagree.  CMS may well have encouraged 
Pennsylvania to create the training program.  Indeed, it makes 
sense that CMS would have done so.  The program ensured 
faster and smoother rolling-out of the nursing home reforms.  
But it is wrong to say that CMS’s support for the program 
conflicts with its opposition to the state paying for the program 
directly.  Those issues are different and reconcilable.  In other 
words, CMS did encourage Pennsylvania to create the PARRI 
program, but there is no evidence that CMS encouraged 
Pennsylvania to pay for the training program directly and then 
claim those payments as administrative costs.  Rather, based on 
the record, CMS showed no support for the kind of payment 
scheme Pennsylvania employed.  It instead showed support for 
the rate-setting scheme where providers paid for the training 
themselves and then the states factored those payments into the 
rate-setting calculation.  Thus, the fact that CMS encouraged 
Pennsylvania to create the training program does not make its 
disallowance of the PARRI costs arbitrary and capricious. 
 
 In fact, the Appeals Board’s position that Pennsylvania 
should have used the rate-setting scheme to have obtained 
reimbursement is consistent with its prior treatment of training 
costs.  For example, in New York State Department of Social 
Services, DAB No. 1146 (1990), the state, like Pennsylvania 
here, claimed FFP for the cost of contracts to train nursing home 
employees.  HCFA, like CMS here, disallowed the payments 
because they were not necessary for the proper and efficient 
administration of the state plan.  On appeal the Board affirmed, 
finding that the costs were related to the services provided by 
provider facilities, and explained why the rate-setting 
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methodology was the best way, in the agency’s view, to 
reimburse such costs.  It further rejected the state’s argument 
that “as a practical matter, it had no other way to recover these 
costs,” reasoning that the state’s failure to structure its scheme 
properly does not allow the state to “change the character of the 
expenditure from a services cost to an administrative cost.”  Id. 
at 6-7.  This prior decision reinforces the Board’s decision in 
this case that providers must pay for their own training costs. 
 
 Pennsylvania argues that we should not give these prior 
decisions any weight.  It asserts that the Appeals Board does not 
have authority to create formal policy for the Secretary, so we 
should not consider those prior decisions.  But even if the 
Board’s decisions do not constitute formal policy, they are 
helpful because they show that the agency had a consistent 
position on training costs.  Cf. Nazareth Hosp. v. Sec’y U.S. 
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 747 F.3d 172, 179 (3d Cir. 
2014) (“Agency action is arbitrary and capricious if the agency 
offers insufficient reasons for treating similar situations 
differently.”). 
 
 In sum, under our narrow review, we will not disturb the 
agency’s finding that PARRI costs are not reimbursable as 
administrative costs.  The Appeals Board determined that 
PARRI training costs are excludable provider training costs 
under the Medicaid statute as reflected in the Letter; that such 
training costs should be paid by providers and factored into the 
state’s rate-setting calculations; that two reasons exist for the 
rate-setting payment calculations; that those reasons comport 
with the Board’s prior treatment of the same issue; and 
Pennsylvania gave no reason why those bases are unsound.  As 
such, the APA counsels us to defer to the agency’s decision. 
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  C. The 1994 SMDL Is Not an Ambiguous Condition   
            on a Federal Grant 
 
 Pennsylvania next argues that, even if we read the 1994 
SMDL to disallow PARRI costs, the disallowance violates 
constitutional spending clause principles.  Pennsylvania asserts 
that the 1994 SMDL’s discussion of training costs and overhead 
costs is ambiguous, and therefore the Letter failed to provide 
sufficient notice that training expenses were disallowable.  
Consequently, Pennsylvania claims, the disallowance is invalid. 
  
 In support, Pennsylvania cites Pennhurst State School & 
Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 101 S.Ct. 1531 (1981) and its 
progeny, which upheld Congress’ power to attach conditions to 
federal grants to states so long as the conditions are stated 
unambiguously.  Id. at 17, 101 S.Ct. at 1540.  To determine 
whether a statute satisfies this clarity requirement, courts “ask 
whether . . . a state official would clearly understand . . . the 
obligations” of the law, and “whether the [statute] furnishes 
clear notice regarding the liability at issue in [the] case.”  
Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 
291, 296, 126 S.Ct. 2455, 2458 (2006).  Because a conditional 
grant is akin to a contract, recipients of federal funds should 
accept the attached conditions “voluntarily and knowingly.”  
Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17, 101 S.Ct. at 1540.  “[W]e must view 
the [Medicaid statute] from the perspective of a state official 
who is engaged in the process of deciding whether the State 
should accept [Medicaid] funds and the obligations that go with 
those funds.”  Arlington, 548 U.S. at 296, 126 S.Ct. at 2459. 
 
 We reject Pennsylvania’s argument.  We note first that 
the argument is narrow.  Pennsylvania does not claim that the 
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Medicaid statute—§ 1396b(a)(7)—or the implementing 
regulations set forth ambiguous conditions of a federal grant.   It 
levels that claim against only the 1994 SMDL.  With that narrow 
scope in mind, Pennsylvania’s theory is shaky.  Pennsylvania 
provides no case—nor are we aware of one—where a court 
invalidated a spending condition based on an agency’s position 
in interpretive guidance.  Nor do we know of such an 
invalidation where the plaintiff challenges the guidance but 
takes no issue with the controlling statute and regulations.   
 
 In any event, even if Pennsylvania had case law support, 
its theory would fail.  We must consider Pennsylvania’s claim 
from the perspective of a state official.  Arlington, 548 U.S. at 
296, 126 S.Ct. at 2459.  Pennsylvania does not challenge either 
the statute or the regulation.  Consequently, Pennsylvania does 
not dispute the circumstance that the official knew the state 
could claim administrative costs that are necessary for the 
proper administration of the plan, 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(a)(7), and 
also knew that determination was left to the sole discretion of 
the Secretary of HHS, id.; 42 C.F.R. § 433.15(b)(7).  
Nonetheless, Pennsylvania claims that the Letter is an 
ambiguous condition on a grant because the official would not 
have known that the Secretary could deem training costs to be 
disallowable overhead costs in the 1994 SMDL.  But that 
argument makes little sense.  If the official knew the applicable 
test and knew the Secretary had discretion to apply the test; and 
the Secretary applied the test reasonably, as we conclude the 
Secretary did here, then the official cannot claim not to have 
been on notice that the disallowance was possible.  
  
 At bottom, Pennsylvania’s position is merely that it did 
not know for sure that the Secretary would deny the PARRI 
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costs until it received CMS’s disallowance letter.  But that 
circumstance does not make the Secretary’s decision to exclude 
the training costs an ambiguous condition of funding.  Rather, as 
is true when an agency reasonably exercises discretion, there 
always was a possibility that the Secretary would make the 
decision reached here.  And Pennsylvania was on notice of that 
possibility when it accepted the Medicaid funds.  As such, we 
reject Pennsylvania’s argument that it lacked notice of a 
condition of receiving the Medicaid funds.    
 
 D. The Denial of Discovery Was Not Abuse of             
           Discretion 
 
 Fourth, Pennsylvania claims that the Appeals Board 
abused its discretion when it denied it the opportunity for 
discovery.  Under HHS regulations, the Board may authorize 
discovery when it determines that it is appropriate to do so.  45 
C.F.R. § 16.9 (“The Board may, at the time it acknowledges an 
appeal or at any appropriate later point, request additional 
documents or information . . . and take such other steps as the 
Board determines appropriate to develop a prompt, sound 
decision.”).  Here, Pennsylvania requested the opportunity for 
discovery to determine if CMS had promised to pay the state for 
the PARRI costs.  Pennsylvania claimed that it has purged any 
such documents, if they existed, pursuant to its record retention 
policy.  The Board denied the motion as speculative and lacking 
any factual basis.  We agree because Pennsylvania did not 
provide a reason to believe CMS made that promise.   
 
 Pennsylvania claims that it should have been allowed the 
opportunity for discovery for two reasons.  First, it notes that 
CMS had been paying for the PARRI costs since 1996 but then 
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abruptly changed course.  Pennsylvania claims that this abrupt 
change raised enough suspicions to warrant discovery.  
However, the OIG audit explains the reason for the change in 
course.  The audit recites that Pennsylvania claimed the PARRI 
costs as “Other Financial Participation” without further detail 
for years until the payments came to OIG’s attention due to 
previous payment issues.  Then Pennsylvania states that a CMS 
representative was on the PARRI task force and might have 
information about any payment agreement.  But Pennsylvania 
does not state what this representative’s role was vis-à-vis CMS 
and the task force or explain the representative’s function on the 
PARRI task force or how the representative was involved in 
Pennsylvania’s reimbursement scheme.  Consequently we 
uphold the Board’s decision to deny discovery. 
 
 E. HHS Grants Administration Manual 
 
 Pennsylvania’s penultimate argument seeks to limit the 
lookback period for CMS’s disallowance decision to three years. 
 The HHS Grants Administration Manual (“GAM” or “the 
Manual”) then in effect, set a time period for computing 
disallowances.  JA 191; GAM § 1-105-60(C)(3)(a)(1).  The 
Manual states that the disallowance period “will cover” the 
time-period the organization was required to retain records.  JA 
191.7  The parties agree that the applicable regulations required 
                                                 
7 The relevant language in the GAM provides: 
 
3. Time Period for Computing Disallowances 
 
a. If the Action Official determines that certain 
costs should be disallowed, the computation of 
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Pennsylvania to keep the records for three years from the date 
Pennsylvania sent the expenditure reports to CMS, though the 
parties also agree that Pennsylvania retained its records for the 
full period for which reimbursement was disallowed.  Because 
OIG told Pennsylvania about its audit in July 2011, 
Pennsylvania argues that the GAM limits CMS’s disallowance 
to 2008, three years earlier.   
 
 The Appeals Board disagreed.  Citing prior Board 
decisions, it held that “the GAM provision does not state that for 
all disallowances, the computation will only cover the period of 
time records are required to be retained.”  JA 35 (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original).  The Board 
further held, based on prior Board precedent, that “the GAM 
provision [does] not bar the disallowance where records in fact 
exist to support the computation of the disallowance, so the 
grantee is not prejudiced by the passage of time.”  Id.  Because 
Pennsylvania did not claim that the records had been destroyed, 
and because there were sufficient records to calculate accurately 
the disallowance back to 1996, the Board affirmed the full 
fifteen-year disallowance period.   
 
 Pennsylvania argues that the Appeals Board was wrong 
                                                                                                             
the disallowance will cover the following periods.  
 
(1) If the costs can be identified to specific 
awards, the computation will cover the period the 
organization is required to retain records under 
applicable records retention requirements.  
 
GAM § 1-105-60(C)(3)(a)(1).  JA 191. 
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because the GAM permits only a three-year disallowance period. 
 We disagree, though we resolve the issue without weighing in 
on the agency’s reading of the GAM.  No matter the 
interpretation of the GAM, the agency was not bound by the 
three-year time limit.  The GAM was not binding because it 
“satisf[ies] none of the criteria which have been developed by 
the courts to determine whether agency regulations have the 
force of law.”  Gatter v. Nimmo, 672 F.2d 343, 347 (3d Cir. 
1982); see also Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785, 789-90, 101 
S.Ct. 1468, 1471-72 (1981) (“[T]here is no doubt that [the 
agency employee] failed to follow the Claims Manual. . . . But 
the Claims Manual is not a regulation.  It has no legal force, and 
it does not bind the [agency].”).  The GAM sets out audit 
policies and procedures for internal use by HHS employees or 
auditors acting on HHS’s behalf;8 it was not published in the 
                                                 
8JA 188 (explaining applicability of GAM to audit procedures); 
see also U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., Grants Policy 
Statement ii (Jan. 1, 2007) (“Recipients are not directly subject 
to the requirements of HHS Grants Policy Directives and 
implementing HHS Grants Administration Manuals (or any 
predecessor OPDIV manuals), which are internal documents 
guiding HHS operations.”), 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/grants/grants/policies-
regulations/hhsgps107.pdf. 
   
Pennsylvania claims, however, that the Secretary has 
cited the Manual in the Code of Federal Regulations, meaning it 
is not merely a guiding document.  That is incorrect.  While the 
Secretary has promulgated regulations that require compliance 
with unrelated GAM policies, see, e.g., 42 C.F.R. §§ 86.19, 
86.33 (requiring compliance with GAM section concerning 
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federal register or promulgated with public notice and comment; 
and there is no other evidence the agency meant to give the 
GAM binding force.  Accordingly, the GAM was promulgated 
to assist the agency in running its audits rather than to set forth a 
binding legal mandate.  See Gatter, 672 F.2d at 347; Concerned 
Residents of Buck Hill Falls v. Grant, 537 F.2d 29, 38 (3d Cir. 
1976) (“[S]ince the Guide and the Handbook are merely internal 
operating procedures, rather than regulations officially 
promulgated under the APA or otherwise, they do not prescribe 
any rule of law binding on the agency.”).  And consequently, 
because the agency has shown that the disallowance decision 
captures every year for which accurate records of 
Pennsylvania’s erroneous claims exist, the decision is not 
arbitrary and capricious.  
  
 F. Judicial Notice of CMS’s Post-Disallowance            
           Statement 
 
 Finally, Pennsylvania claims that the District Court erred 
in not taking judicial notice of a CMS statement about training 
costs issued in July 2015, three months after the Appeals Board 
issued its final decision in this case and thus long after the 
events involved in this case. 
 
 In July 2015 CMS issued a “Questions and Answers” 
document addressing administrative claims for training costs.  
One of the three questions reads as follows: 
                                                                                                             
animal welfare), there is no regulation requiring compliance 
with the GAM’s policy for computing the disallowance time 
period. 
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Q: Is federal Medicaid administrative match 
available for provider training activities? 
 
A: Yes. Provider training provided by the 
Medicaid agency or its contracted designee 
regarding the scope or the benefits of Medicaid 
covered services, or that is aimed at improving the 
delivery of Medicaid services, is reimbursable as 
a Medicaid administrative expenditure.  This 
could include, for example, training for case 
managers, individuals who develop and 
coordinate person-centered care planning, primary 
care practitioners, or hospital discharge planners. 
 
JA 53.  
  
 After the District Court denied Pennsylvania’s motion to 
supplement the administrative record with this document on the 
ground that it was published after the agency rendered its 
decision, Pennsylvania asked the Court to take judicial notice of 
the document.  The Court declined to do so because it regarded 
the request as an “end around the restrictions on record 
supplementation” and the parties disputed what the CMS 
document meant.  Pennsylvania Dep’t of Human Servs., 241 F. 
Supp. 3d at 511-12.  Pennsylvania challenges the decision not to 
take judicial notice of the statement, and we review the Court’s 
decision on the point for abuse of discretion.  In re NAHC, Inc. 
Sec. Litig., 306 F.3d 1314, 1323 (3d Cir. 2002).  
 
 A court may take judicial notice of an adjudicative fact if 
that fact is not subject to reasonable dispute. Fed. R. Evid. 
201(b).  “A judicially noticed fact must either be generally 
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known within the jurisdiction of the trial court, or be capable of 
accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose 
accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.”  Werner v. Werner, 
267 F.3d 288, 295 (3d Cir. 2001).  
 
 Here, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in 
declining to take judicial notice of the CMS Question and 
Answer document.  Although the document appears to provide 
some support for Pennsylvania’s contention that PARRI costs 
are now allowable, such a conclusion is not indisputable.  In 
order to reach that conclusion, several related questions which 
the document does not address must be answered as well.  For 
example, it is unclear if this rule reverses the 1994 SMDL or 
clarifies a requirement that the Letter already states.  It is also 
unclear without more information how the answer can be 
squared with 42 C.F.R. § 433.15(b)(7)’s requirement that the 
training must be “necessary for proper and efficient 
administration of the State plan” because arguably training for 
medical services is distinct from the administration of a 
Medicaid plan.  We take no position on these questions, but note 
that they open up the CMS document to reasonable dispute. 
 
 Furthermore, even if we agreed with Pennsylvania that 
the document clearly contradicts the 1994 SMDL, we still would 
not conclude that the District Court erred in declining to 
judicially notice it.  Just as the Secretary had authority to 
interpret the Medicaid statute in the 1994 SMDL, so, too, does 
the Secretary have the right to change the CMS interpretation 
over the course of years.  See Pennsylvania Fed’n of 
Sportsmen’s Clubs, Inc. v. Kempthorne, 497 F.3d 337, 350-51 
(3d Cir. 2007) (“[A]n administrative agency is not disqualified 
from changing its mind. . . .”) (quoting Good Samaritan Hosp. v. 
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Shalala, 508 U.S. 402, 417, 113 S.Ct. 2151, 2161 (1993)).  And 
if the Question and Answer document is in fact an about face on 
the issue of training costs, as Pennsylvania suggests, that 
circumstance would call into question the new policy change, 
not CMS’s original position from 1994.  See Revak v. Nat’l 
Mines Corp., 808 F.2d 996, 1002 (3d Cir. 1986) (“We do not 
believe that we should defer to the [agency’s] change of policy 
in the absence of [a reasoned analysis by the agency].”), 
abrogated on other grounds by Mullins Coal Co. of Va. v. Dir., 
Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 484 
U.S. 135, 159 & n.34, 108 S.Ct. 427, 440 & n.34 (1987).  
Consequently, we cannot say that the District Court erred in 
declining to take judicial notice of the document.   
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the 
District Court entered March 13, 2017, affirming the decision of 
the Appeals Board. 
 
